Merge pull request #28957 from yuwata/core-mount-set-dirty-on-umount

core/credential,mount: re-read /proc/self/mountinfo before invoking umount command
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering
2023-09-07 11:54:52 +02:00
committed by GitHub
21 changed files with 122 additions and 184 deletions

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@@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
#include "cap-list.h"
#include "capability-util.h"
#include "cpu-set-util.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "creds-util.h"
#include "dbus-execute.h"
#include "dbus-util.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "errno-list.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "exec-credential.h"
#include "execute.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"

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@@ -3,22 +3,21 @@
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include "acl-util.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "creds-util.h"
#include "exec-credential.h"
#include "execute.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "glob-util.h"
#include "io-util.h"
#include "label-util.h"
#include "missing_syscall.h"
#include "mkdir-label.h"
#include "mount-util.h"
#include "mount.h"
#include "mountpoint-util.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "recurse-dir.h"
#include "rm-rf.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
ExecSetCredential *exec_set_credential_free(ExecSetCredential *sc) {
@@ -96,6 +95,25 @@ static int get_credential_directory(
return 1;
}
int exec_context_get_credential_directory(
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *params,
const char *unit,
char **ret) {
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(unit);
assert(ret);
if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context)) {
*ret = NULL;
return 0;
}
return get_credential_directory(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], unit, ret);
}
int unit_add_default_credential_dependencies(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *m = NULL;
int r;
@@ -121,19 +139,21 @@ int unit_add_default_credential_dependencies(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
return unit_add_dependency_by_name(u, UNIT_AFTER, m, /* add_reference= */ true, UNIT_DEPENDENCY_FILE);
}
int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix, const char *unit) {
int exec_context_destroy_credentials(Unit *u) {
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
int r;
assert(c);
assert(u);
r = get_credential_directory(runtime_prefix, unit, &p);
r = get_credential_directory(u->manager->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], u->id, &p);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
/* This is either a tmpfs/ramfs of its own, or a plain directory. Either way, let's first try to
* unmount it, and afterwards remove the mount point */
(void) umount2(p, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
if (umount2(p, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW) >= 0)
(void) mount_invalidate_state_by_path(u->manager, p);
(void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_CHMOD);
return 0;
@@ -732,8 +752,7 @@ static int setup_credentials_internal(
bool reuse_workspace, /* Whether to reuse any existing workspace mount if it already is a mount */
bool must_mount, /* Whether to require that we mount something, it's not OK to use the plain directory fall back */
uid_t uid,
gid_t gid,
int *ret_mount_fd) {
gid_t gid) {
int r, workspace_mounted; /* negative if we don't know yet whether we have/can mount something; true
* if we mounted something; false if we definitely can't mount anything */
@@ -851,27 +870,6 @@ static int setup_credentials_internal(
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (ret_mount_fd) {
_cleanup_close_ int mount_fd = -EBADF;
r = mount_fd = RET_NERRNO(open_tree(AT_FDCWD, workspace, OPEN_TREE_CLONE | OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC));
if (r >= 0) {
/* The workspace is already cloned in the above, and not necessary
* anymore. Even though the workspace is unmounted when the short-lived
* child process exits, let's explicitly unmount it here for safety. */
r = umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, workspace, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
if (r < 0)
return r;
*ret_mount_fd = TAKE_FD(mount_fd);
return 0;
}
/* Old kernel? Unprivileged? */
if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r))
return r;
}
/* And mount it to the final place, read-only */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, workspace, final, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
} else
@@ -892,35 +890,24 @@ static int setup_credentials_internal(
return -errno;
}
if (ret_mount_fd)
*ret_mount_fd = -EBADF;
return 0;
}
int setup_credentials(
int exec_setup_credentials(
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *params,
const char *unit,
uid_t uid,
gid_t gid,
char **ret_path,
int *ret_mount_fd) {
gid_t gid) {
_cleanup_close_pair_ int socket_pair[2] = PIPE_EBADF;
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int mount_fd = -EBADF;
int r;
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(ret_path);
assert(ret_mount_fd);
if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context)) {
*ret_path = NULL;
*ret_mount_fd = -EBADF;
if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context))
return 0;
}
if (!params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -943,12 +930,7 @@ int setup_credentials(
if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
return r;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, socket_pair) < 0)
return -errno;
r = safe_fork_full("(sd-mkdcreds)",
NULL, &socket_pair[1], 1,
FORK_DEATHSIG|FORK_CLOSE_ALL_FDS|FORK_WAIT|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS|FORK_REOPEN_LOG, NULL);
r = safe_fork("(sd-mkdcreds)", FORK_DEATHSIG|FORK_WAIT|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *u = NULL;
@@ -984,15 +966,14 @@ int setup_credentials(
true, /* reuse the workspace if it is already a mount */
false, /* it's OK to fall back to a plain directory if we can't mount anything */
uid,
gid,
NULL);
gid);
(void) rmdir(u); /* remove the workspace again if we can. */
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (r == 0) { /* child */
} else if (r == 0) {
/* We managed to set up a mount namespace, and are now in a child. That's great. In this case
* we can use the same directory for all cases, after turning off propagation. Question
@@ -1011,8 +992,6 @@ int setup_credentials(
* given that we do this in a privately namespaced short-lived single-threaded process that
* no one else sees this should be OK to do. */
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
/* Turn off propagation from our namespace to host */
r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, "/dev", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL);
if (r < 0)
@@ -1027,14 +1006,7 @@ int setup_credentials(
false, /* do not reuse /dev/shm if it is already a mount, under no circumstances */
true, /* insist that something is mounted, do not allow fallback to plain directory */
uid,
gid,
&fd);
if (r < 0)
goto child_fail;
r = send_one_fd_iov(socket_pair[1], fd,
&IOVEC_MAKE((int[]) { fd >= 0 }, sizeof(int)), 1,
MSG_DONTWAIT);
gid);
if (r < 0)
goto child_fail;
@@ -1042,17 +1014,6 @@ int setup_credentials(
child_fail:
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else { /* parent */
int ret;
struct iovec iov = IOVEC_MAKE(&ret, sizeof(int));
r = receive_one_fd_iov(socket_pair[0], &iov, 1, MSG_DONTWAIT, &mount_fd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (ret > 0 && mount_fd < 0)
return -EIO;
}
/* If the credentials dir is empty and not a mount point, then there's no point in having it. Let's
@@ -1060,8 +1021,5 @@ int setup_credentials(
* actually end up mounting anything on it. In that case we'd rather have ENOENT than EACCESS being
* seen by users when trying access this inode. */
(void) rmdir(p);
*ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
*ret_mount_fd = TAKE_FD(mount_fd);
return 0;
}

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@@ -37,14 +37,18 @@ extern const struct hash_ops exec_load_credential_hash_ops;
bool exec_context_has_encrypted_credentials(ExecContext *c);
bool exec_context_has_credentials(const ExecContext *c);
int exec_context_get_credential_directory(
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *params,
const char *unit,
char **ret);
int unit_add_default_credential_dependencies(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c);
int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_root, const char *unit);
int setup_credentials(
int exec_context_destroy_credentials(Unit *u);
int exec_setup_credentials(
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *params,
const char *unit,
uid_t uid,
gid_t gid,
char **ret_path,
int *ret_mount_fd);
gid_t gid);

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@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
@@ -50,12 +49,12 @@
#include "chown-recursive.h"
#include "constants.h"
#include "cpu-set-util.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "data-fd-util.h"
#include "env-file.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "errno-list.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "exec-credential.h"
#include "execute.h"
#include "exit-status.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
@@ -73,7 +72,6 @@
#include "missing_fs.h"
#include "missing_ioprio.h"
#include "missing_prctl.h"
#include "missing_syscall.h"
#include "mkdir-label.h"
#include "namespace.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
@@ -1866,7 +1864,6 @@ static int build_environment(
dev_t journal_stream_dev,
ino_t journal_stream_ino,
const char *memory_pressure_path,
const char *creds_path,
char ***ret) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL;
@@ -2044,8 +2041,12 @@ static int build_environment(
our_env[n_env++] = x;
}
if (creds_path) {
x = strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", creds_path);
_cleanup_free_ char *creds_dir = NULL;
r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(c, p, u->id, &creds_dir);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
x = strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", creds_dir);
if (!x)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -3113,14 +3114,12 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
const ExecParameters *params,
ExecRuntime *runtime,
const char *memory_pressure_path,
const char *creds_path,
int creds_fd,
char **error_path) {
_cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL, **symlinks = NULL,
**read_write_paths_cleanup = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *incoming_dir = NULL, *propagate_dir = NULL,
_cleanup_free_ char *creds_path = NULL, *incoming_dir = NULL, *propagate_dir = NULL,
*extension_dir = NULL, *host_os_release_stage = NULL;
const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL;
char **read_write_paths;
@@ -3222,6 +3221,12 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
if (context->mount_propagation_flag == MS_SHARED)
log_unit_debug(u, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) {
r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(context, params, u->id, &creds_path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
if (params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) {
propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id);
if (!propagate_dir)
@@ -3290,7 +3295,6 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
tmp_dir,
var_tmp_dir,
creds_path,
creds_fd,
context->log_namespace,
context->mount_propagation_flag,
&verity,
@@ -3944,7 +3948,7 @@ static int exec_child(
int r, ngids = 0, exec_fd;
_cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL;
const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL, *memory_pressure_path = NULL, *creds_path = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL, *memory_pressure_path = NULL;
const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
char **final_argv = NULL;
dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0;
@@ -3975,7 +3979,6 @@ static int exec_child(
int ngids_after_pam = 0;
_cleanup_free_ int *fds = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **fdnames = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int creds_fd = -EBADF;
assert(unit);
assert(command);
@@ -4426,7 +4429,7 @@ static int exec_child(
}
if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) {
r = setup_credentials(context, params, unit->id, uid, gid, &creds_path, &creds_fd);
r = exec_setup_credentials(context, params, unit->id, uid, gid);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS;
return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m");
@@ -4446,7 +4449,6 @@ static int exec_child(
journal_stream_dev,
journal_stream_ino,
memory_pressure_path,
creds_path,
&our_env);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
@@ -4640,7 +4642,7 @@ static int exec_child(
if (needs_mount_namespace) {
_cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL;
r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, creds_path, creds_fd, &error_path);
r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m",
@@ -4648,19 +4650,6 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
if (creds_fd >= 0) {
assert(creds_path);
/* When a mount namespace is not requested, then the target directory may not exist yet.
* Here, we ignore the failure, as if it fails, the subsequent move_mount() will fail. */
(void) mkdir_p_label(creds_path, 0755);
if (move_mount(creds_fd, "", AT_FDCWD, creds_path, MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS;
return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to mount credentials directory on %s: %m", creds_path);
}
}
if (needs_sandboxing) {
r = apply_protect_hostname(unit, context, exit_status);
if (r < 0)

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@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@
#include "conf-parser.h"
#include "core-varlink.h"
#include "cpu-set-util.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "creds-util.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "errno-list.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "exec-credential.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "fs-util.h"

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@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ libcore_sources = files(
'bpf-socket-bind.c',
'cgroup.c',
'core-varlink.c',
'credential.c',
'dbus-automount.c',
'dbus-cgroup.c',
'dbus-device.c',
@@ -35,6 +34,7 @@ libcore_sources = files(
'dynamic-user.c',
'efi-random.c',
'emergency-action.c',
'exec-credential.c',
'execute.c',
'generator-setup.c',
'ima-setup.c',

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@@ -1284,6 +1284,11 @@ static int mount_stop(Unit *u) {
assert(m);
/* When we directly call umount() for a path, then the state of the corresponding mount unit may be
* outdated. Let's re-read mountinfo now and update the state. */
if (m->invalidated_state)
(void) mount_process_proc_self_mountinfo(u->manager);
switch (m->state) {
case MOUNT_UNMOUNTING:
@@ -1318,6 +1323,11 @@ static int mount_stop(Unit *u) {
mount_enter_signal(m, MOUNT_UNMOUNTING_SIGKILL, MOUNT_SUCCESS);
return 0;
case MOUNT_DEAD:
case MOUNT_FAILED:
/* The mount has just been unmounted by somebody else. */
return 0;
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
@@ -2067,6 +2077,8 @@ static int mount_process_proc_self_mountinfo(Manager *m) {
LIST_FOREACH(units_by_type, u, m->units_by_type[UNIT_MOUNT]) {
Mount *mount = MOUNT(u);
mount->invalidated_state = false;
if (!mount_is_mounted(mount)) {
/* A mount point is not around right now. It might be gone, or might never have
@@ -2160,6 +2172,26 @@ static int mount_dispatch_io(sd_event_source *source, int fd, uint32_t revents,
return mount_process_proc_self_mountinfo(m);
}
int mount_invalidate_state_by_path(Manager *manager, const char *path) {
_cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
Unit *u;
int r;
assert(manager);
assert(path);
r = unit_name_from_path(path, ".mount", &name);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to generate unit name from path \"%s\", ignoring: %m", path);
u = manager_get_unit(manager, name);
if (!u)
return -ENOENT;
MOUNT(u)->invalidated_state = true;
return 0;
}
static void mount_reset_failed(Unit *u) {
Mount *m = MOUNT(u);

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@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ struct Mount {
MountParameters parameters_proc_self_mountinfo;
MountParameters parameters_fragment;
bool invalidated_state:1; /* Set when the 'state' of the mount unit may be outdated, and we need to
* re-read /proc/self/mountinfo. */
bool from_proc_self_mountinfo:1;
bool from_fragment:1;
@@ -92,6 +94,8 @@ extern const UnitVTable mount_vtable;
void mount_fd_event(Manager *m, int events);
int mount_invalidate_state_by_path(Manager *manager, const char *path);
const char* mount_exec_command_to_string(MountExecCommand i) _const_;
MountExecCommand mount_exec_command_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;

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@@ -74,8 +74,7 @@ typedef enum MountMode {
EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
MQUEUEFS,
READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the 2nd lowest priority. */
MKDIR, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
_MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
} MountMode;
@@ -232,7 +231,6 @@ static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
[EXTENSION_IMAGES] = "extension-images",
[MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
[READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "read-write-implicit",
[MKDIR] = "mkdir",
};
/* Helper struct for naming simplicity and reusability */
@@ -1549,12 +1547,6 @@ static int apply_one_mount(
case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
return mount_overlay(m);
case MKDIR:
r = mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 1;
default:
assert_not_reached();
}
@@ -2021,7 +2013,6 @@ int setup_namespace(
const char* tmp_dir,
const char* var_tmp_dir,
const char *creds_path,
int creds_fd,
const char *log_namespace,
unsigned long mount_propagation_flag,
VeritySettings *verity,
@@ -2344,22 +2335,13 @@ int setup_namespace(
.flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
};
/* If we have mount fd for credentials directory, then it will be mounted after
* namespace is set up. So, here we only create the mount point. */
if (creds_fd < 0)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = creds_path,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true,
.source_const = creds_path,
.ignore = true,
};
else
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = creds_path,
.mode = MKDIR,
};
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = creds_path,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true,
.source_const = creds_path,
.ignore = true,
};
} else {
/* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
* credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */

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@@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ int setup_namespace(
const char *tmp_dir,
const char *var_tmp_dir,
const char *creds_path,
int creds_fd,
const char *log_namespace,
unsigned long mount_propagation_flag,
VeritySettings *verity,

View File

@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@
#include "cgroup-util.h"
#include "chase.h"
#include "core-varlink.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "dbus-unit.h"
#include "dbus.h"
#include "dropin.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "exec-credential.h"
#include "execute.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fileio-label.h"
@@ -5994,7 +5994,7 @@ void unit_destroy_runtime_data(Unit *u, const ExecContext *context) {
if (context->runtime_directory_preserve_mode == EXEC_PRESERVE_NO)
exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(context, u->manager->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME]);
exec_context_destroy_credentials(context, u->manager->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], u->id);
exec_context_destroy_credentials(u);
exec_context_destroy_mount_ns_dir(u);
}

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@@ -282,11 +282,7 @@ static void test_exec_cpuaffinity(Manager *m) {
static void test_exec_credentials(Manager *m) {
test(m, "exec-set-credential.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
test(m, "exec-set-credential-with-mount-namespace.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
test(m, "exec-set-credential-with-seccomp.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
test(m, "exec-load-credential.service", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(m) ? 0 : EXIT_CREDENTIALS, CLD_EXITED);
test(m, "exec-load-credential-with-mount-namespace.service", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(m) ? 0 : EXIT_CREDENTIALS, CLD_EXITED);
test(m, "exec-load-credential-with-seccomp.service", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(m) ? 0 : EXIT_CREDENTIALS, CLD_EXITED);
test(m, "exec-credentials-dir-specifier.service", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(m) ? 0 : EXIT_CREDENTIALS, CLD_EXITED);
}

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@@ -194,7 +194,6 @@ TEST(protect_kernel_logs) {
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
-EBADF,
NULL,
0,
NULL,

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@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
tmp_dir,
var_tmp_dir,
NULL,
-EBADF,
NULL,
0,
NULL,

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@@ -10,3 +10,9 @@ ExecStart=test %d/very_top_secret = "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/very_top_secret"
LoadCredential=very_top_secret
ExecStart=test %d/very_top_secret = "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/very_top_secret"
ExecStart=sh -c 'test %d/very_top_secret = "$TOP_SECRET"'
ExecStartPost=test %d/very_top_secret = "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/very_top_secret"
ExecStartPost=sh -c 'test %d/very_top_secret = "$TOP_SECRET"'
ExecStop=test %d/very_top_secret = "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/very_top_secret"
ExecStop=sh -c 'test %d/very_top_secret = "$TOP_SECRET"'
ExecStopPost=test %d/very_top_secret = "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/very_top_secret"
ExecStopPost=sh -c 'test %d/very_top_secret = "$TOP_SECRET"'

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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
[Unit]
Description=Test for LoadCredential=
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.load-credential)" = "foo"'
Type=oneshot
LoadCredential=test-execute.load-credential
PrivateMounts=yes

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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
[Unit]
Description=Test for LoadCredential=
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.load-credential)" = "foo"'
Type=oneshot
LoadCredential=test-execute.load-credential
SystemCallFilter=~open_tree move_mount

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@@ -4,5 +4,8 @@ Description=Test for LoadCredential=
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.load-credential)" = "foo"'
ExecStartPost=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.load-credential)" = "foo"'
ExecStop=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.load-credential)" = "foo"'
ExecStopPost=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.load-credential)" = "foo"'
Type=oneshot
LoadCredential=test-execute.load-credential

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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
[Unit]
Description=Test for SetCredential=
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.set-credential)" = "hoge"'
Type=oneshot
SetCredential=test-execute.set-credential:hoge
PrivateMounts=yes

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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
[Unit]
Description=Test for SetCredential=
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.set-credential)" = "hoge"'
Type=oneshot
SetCredential=test-execute.set-credential:hoge
SystemCallFilter=~open_tree move_mount

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@@ -4,5 +4,8 @@ Description=Test for SetCredential=
[Service]
ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.set-credential)" = "hoge"'
ExecStartPost=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.set-credential)" = "hoge"'
ExecStop=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.set-credential)" = "hoge"'
ExecStopPost=/bin/sh -x -c 'test "$$(cat %d/test-execute.set-credential)" = "hoge"'
Type=oneshot
SetCredential=test-execute.set-credential:hoge